INDIAN ARMY NEWS

[Dudee]

Rohtak bids tearful adieu to its hero


Rohtak, March 5
Thousands of residents bade a tearful adieu to Capt Deepak Kumar Sharma, who fell to the bullets of militants during a gunbattle in the Tral area in Pulwama district of Jammu and Kashmir yesterday morning, during his cremation which took place with full state and military honours here this evening.

The body of the 26-year-old officer reached his house at Bharat Colony here around 6 pm today in a bedecked military vehicle accompanied by senior Army officials.

The martyr’s last journey, which began around 6.40 pm, was attended by a large number of local residents, besides family members, relatives and officials of the administration and the Army.

A contingent of Army jawans and the Haryana police fired into the air as a mark of respect to the departed officer. Wreaths were laid on the body by local MP Deepender Singh Hooda, besides officials and residents.

People had started converging on the residence of Naresh Kumar Sharma, father of the martyr, at Bharat Colony here since yesterday.

Deepak had recently got engaged to a woman Army officer and was to marry her in November.

[Dudee]

Punjab offers gallantry benefits to all
Also announces 40 pc allowance hike for awardees from state


Chandigarh, March 6
Punjab, described as the sword arm of the nation, has offered to extend certain benefits to gallantry award winners across the nation regardless of their domicile.

Announcing this here today, Finance Minister Manpreet Singh Badal said Punjab would be willing to pay the same allowance being given to gallantry awardees belonging to Punjab to those from any other state where the local authorities are unable to do so.

Addressing members of the War Decorated India (WDI) at their triennial convention here today, Badal also announced a 40 per cent increase in the allowances being paid by the state government to gallantry awardees in Punjab.

The WDI is an association of recipients of the Param Vir Chakra (PVC), Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), Vir Chakra (VrC) and awards given for gallantry in war or in the face of the enemy. It does not include recipients of other awards for bravery. About 200 gallantry award winners, their family members or widows from al across the country attended the two-day event here.

Stating that his move does not have any political connotations, Badal said that Punjab has been in the centre of all wars and the state identifies itself very closely with the armed forces. “It is not the question of money, but that of the izzat of the soldiers. It is the least that we can do,” he said.

While some states like Punjab and Haryana have extended considerable benefits to gallantry award winners in the respective states, many other sates have neglected them or are doling out a pittance. In some states allowances have not been revised for decades and the allowance per month even for the highest award is still in two digit figures.

Punjab pays a monthly allowance of Rs 10,000 to PVC recipients and Rs 8,500 and Rs 5,500 to MVC and VrC recipients respectively. Punjab has a tally of four PVCs, 52 MVC and 250 VrCs, out of which only 17 MVC winners and 110 VrC winners are surviving.

At present, there are about 1,550 surviving soldiers who were decorated for gallantry in various wars fought since independence. The numbers are steadily decreasing. So far only 21 officers and men have been decorated with the PVC, the highest award for bravery in the face of the enemy. Out of these 14 were conferred posthumously. Only three recipients of the PVC - one pertaining to Siachen operations and the other two to the 1999 Kargil conflict, are surviving.

A major issue with decorated soldiers is that when it comes to recognition ro grant of benefits, they get a raw deal vis-à-vis freedom fighters or eminent sports persons. The ministries of home affairs or sports are able to have their way when it comes to the welfare of its beneficiaries, but the defence ministry on the contrary, is unable to effectively pursue the interests of the veterans.

Also, a large number of cases where land was promised to gallantry award winners or their widows are pending with various state governments even decades after the awards were announced. Punjab chief minister Parkash Singh Badal had ordered a review of all pending land grant cases a few months ago after some gallantry awardees had apprised him of the situation.

[Dudee]

Flats for jawans: Panel raps MoD for delay


New Delhi, March 6
In a scathing remark on the delay in construction of houses for armed forces jawans, the Parliamentary Standing Committee of Defence has said that the Ministry of Defence was “rather casual” in handling the project. It suggested that the project’s execution be decentralised and handled by the command-formation of the forces for speedy completion.

The committee said that the ministry could not properly analyse the progress of works under Phase-I of the Married Accommodation Project (MAP) under which apartments are to be provided to jawans, airmen and sailors of the Army, Air Force and Navy, respectively. It said that the ministry - even at the time of seeking approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for extending the probable date of completion of construction did not analyse the progress - as was borne out by the fact that works at certain stations continued to be plagued by delays beyond the extended date.

The panel said that MoD did not pay adequate attention towards aspects relating to establishment of the main executive agency and the work procedures required to be put in place before embarking upon a project of such nature.

The Cabinet Committee on Security gave permission on May, 2002 for construction of 61,658 dwelling units during Phase-I to be executed between 2002-03 and 2005-06. The number of dwelling units approved for construction under Phase-I was subsequently reduced to 58,391 and the probable date of completion was extended by three years to January 1, 2009.

The Committee said it was “distressed” to find out that the construction of dwelling units under Phase-I had not progressed as planned. There had been a delay ranging from three months to over three years in completion of projects in as many as 79 out of 86 stations of Phase-I.

The Committee, presenting its report in Parliament earlier this week, said it was “perturbed to note” that even after reducing the dwelling units for construction and the three-year extension, the Ministry could construct only 41,088 dwelling units as on October 31, 2009. This was a huge gap of 20,570 dwelling units in comparison to original Phase-I targets.

The Committee further noted that the MoD had fixed March 31, 2012, as the probable date of completion of Phase II but had not drawn any time-schedule for the remaining phases. It had specifically desired that a realistic time schedule for expeditious completion of all four phases of MAP be drawn out without any intervening period among these.

The Committee also said that the Ministry has neither prescribed any time frame for completion of the Married Accommodation Project in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East nor had it shown any progress

[Dudee]

Permanent commission: HC sides with women
They’re on a par with male officers, tells Centre


New Delhi, March 12
In a path-breaking judgement, the Delhi High Court today directed the Centre to offer within two months Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commissioned (SSC) women officers of the Air Force and the Army at par with male SSC officers with all consequential benefits, including promotion.

At present, the Indian Army offers permanent commission to women after 10 years of SSC. This is applicable to those who were recruited after March 2009 and that too only in two streams — the Judge Adjutant General (JAG) branch and the Education corps. Women are also recruited in Signals, Engineers, Ordnance and Air Defence but are not eligible for PC.

In the IAF, women are offered a permanent option in the Legal, Accounts and Education corps. Women chopper and transport pilots, engineering corps, Logistics and Meteorological streams are not eligible for permanent commission. At present, there are about 1,050 and 827 women officers in the Army and the IAF, respectively. Separately, the Navy has 280 women.

Strangely, and against the principles of natural justice, those women who were recruited before March 2009 were not offered any permanent commission. They simply retire after 10 years or at best get another 4 years’ extension in service. In reality, the Ministry of Defence existing policy will help the women only in 2019 when the first batch will be eligible.

Correcting this anomaly, a Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Mool Chand Garg today ruled: “Women officers of the Air Force who had opted for PC and were not granted PC but granted extension of SSCs and of the Army are entitled to PC at par with male SSC officers.”

The benefit would be extended to women officers recruited prior to change of policy ( March 2009) and the PC shall be offered to them after completion of five years. However, these benefits would be available only to women officers in service or who approached the HC but retired when the case was pending in the court, the Bench clarified.

The court made significant remark on having women in combat roles saying “the claim of absorption in areas of operation not open for recruitment of women officers cannot be sustained being a policy decision.”

The court also refused to interfere with the policy decision which does not offer PC to SSC officers across the board for men and women being on parity and as part of manpower management exercises.

The HC clarified that those women officers, who “have not attained the age of retirement available for the PC officers shall, however, be reinstated in service and shall be granted all consequential benefits including promotion, except for the pay and allowance for the period they have not been in service.”

The HC expressed the hope that with the expanding horizon of women participation in different walks of life, the respondents would be encouraged to have larger participation of women in more areas of operation both for SSC and PC.

[Dudee]

Haryana opens its coffers to war widows


Chandigarh, March 22
Recognising the sacrifices made by Haryana’s defence personnel, the Haryana government has decided to honour war widows, who will be awarded an assistance of Rs 1,000 per month. This honour will also be extended to widows of martyrs of “war-like” situations.

Chief Minister Bhupinder Singh Hooda said this scheme was for war widows of the Army, Navy and Air Force personnel killed during war. No other family member would be entitled to the award money.

As many as 1,308 widows would be given this honour in addition to the pension they are getting from the Ministry of Defence. Probably, Haryana is the only state to award such honour to the war widows. Elsewhere, financial assistance is only provided to widows of personnel who don’t have any other source of income. This assistance is be disbursed through Zila Sainik Boards across the state.

The secretary of the Rajya Sainik Board, Brig KS Budhwar, said the government had been considering the scheme for some time now. “ll women whose husbands were killed during any declared war or during a war-like situation will be entitled to this assistance. We have given instructions to Zila Sainik Boards to send us forms for applying for this assistance. These will be sent back to us for clearance after which sanction for assistance will be given,” he said. The scheme will be applicable from August 1, 2009.

During the recent Vidhan Sabha session, the government had doubled the war jagir too. It hiked the amount from Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000 per year which was passed by the assembly.

The government has also hiked assistance to WW- II veterans and their widows from Rs 1,000 to 1,500 per month and that of ex-servicemen aged over 60.

[Dudee]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100327/edit.htm


Inglorious record
Arjun tank long time in the making

For 36 years India has been struggling to develop the Arjun main battle tank. This three-and-a-half decade-long quest since 1974 is perhaps the longest in the world’s history of the development of this land-based mechanised weapon system that facilitates rapid mobility for any army. For the Indian Army in particular, which has a long, vast and vulnerable border to defend in the plains of Punjab, Rajasthan and parts of Jammu, tanks comprise a crucial fighting instrument to both mount a counter-attack or blunt an offensive in the plains.

But while the Arjun tank may be a proud symbol of technology demonstration at the Republic Day parade every year, it continues to be elusive as both an indigenous product and, more importantly, a weapon system for large-scale induction into the army. Almost 60 per cent of the tank, including its engine, tracks, transmissions and the gun sighting system — all of which are critical components – are imported. Yet, despite two decades of trials, the tank is still awaiting the army’s nod for approval. The Arjun tank presents a microcosm of the enormous difficulties India is facing in its quest for indigenisation of weapon systems and platforms. From questionable capabilities in strategic technologies, constantly changing qualitative requirements by the army that seeks the best and the latest, to extensive and extended user trials that have spanned almost two decades and, on occasions, imposition of technology denial regimes, it has been a constant struggle for India’s defence research and development organisation and its affiliated units.

There is no doubt that for India to be a credible independent military power, it is imperative to become self-reliant. Currently, India imports 70 per cent of its weapon systems, which is hardly a satisfactory situation for a country that aspires to a place as a geopolitical power and gets regularly commented on by the defence minister and in successive parliamentary standing committee reports. India needs a thorough re-examination of its military-industrial complex and greater realism about the projects it undertakes.




Thought for the Day

Let us not envy others’ knowledge but strive to learn from them. — The Upanishads



Raw deal for veterans
Demystifying one rank one pension
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)

Veterans recently went to Rashtrapati Bhavan to return the sixth pack of medals to the President of India. But the President could not be there to receive the medals, so they came back disappointed. For a veteran, his medals are his most valued and cherished possession. These are heirlooms for their families.

Medals are earned under difficult conditions. Some by laying down life during war and in fighting insurgents, others for gallantry in the face of the enemy and yet some others for wounds suffered during operations. For veterans to part with their medals is an extreme step of desperation, caused by frustration and distress. Why have the veterans been driven to such a state of anguish!

Successive Central Pay Commissions (CPCs) repeatedly and viciously lowered the pay and status of defence personnel. To mention just two cases, DIG of police, whose pay and status was in between that of a Lieutenant-Colonel and Colonel now stands equated with a Brigadier for pay etc. DIG rank comes after 14 years service while that of a Brigadier after 26-28 years. So absurd has been the dispensation that a Brigadier was given more pension than a Major-General. The Sixth Pay Commission introduced a dozen more anomalies.

The Fourth Pay Commission granted rank pay up to the rank of Brigadiers. Through sleight of hand, the Ministry of Defence deducted the amount of rank pay from the basic pay. Later, the Supreme Court has finally set it right. The Supreme Court had also noted, in an indirect manner, the untenability of granting different pensions to persons of the same rank, irrespective of their date of retirement.

The Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) at Chandigarh has drawn the government’s attention to the Supreme Court’s point and has given the Central Government four months to resolve the issue. Left to bureaucracy, nothing much can be expected. Therefore, the veterans decided to continue their struggle for One Rank One Pension (OROP).

Successive Presidents, Prime Ministers, Defence Ministers and the chairperson of the Congress party, at various times, accepted the grant of OROP. However, the bureaucracy has been frightening the political executive that giving OROP to the defence services will open a Pandora’s box. Every other government employee will ask for the same. This is patently false and mendacious contention.

In all, 83 per cent of defence services personnel retire between the ages of 34 and 37 years. Another 5 to 12 per cent retire at the ages between 44 and 52 years. Only 0.35 per cent retire at the age of 60. While all civil employees serve up to the age of 60 years, they step up to the top of their respective pay bands, get all the three Assured Career Progressions (ACPs) and consequently not only draw increasing pay but end up with much higher pension.

The 83 per cent of military personnel who retire at 34-37 age, that is after 17 years service, do not qualify for even the second ACP which comes into play only after 20 years service. Since some may not grasp the import of this gross injustice, more appropriately a mischief, spelling out the monetary position would be in order, but a little later.

Subsequent to the ham-handed dispensation of the Sixth Central Pay Commission which drew strong response from the defence services headquarters, the government appointed a Committee of Secretaries to go into these anomalies. In the Sixth Central Pay Commission, the villain of the piece was the IAS officer on this Commission.

Now when the Committee of Secretaries was constituted to address the anomalies, the same IAS officer also formed part of this committee. Thus, it became a case where the prosecutor also formed part of the jury! The committee endlessly dragged its feet and finally omitted OROP in its recommendations.

A comparison of the total amount drawn in terms of pay and pension by a soldier and pay by his counterpart in the civil by the time both reach the age of 60 years is Rs 33.3 lakh more for the civil servant; this figure at the age of 70 is Rs 42.670 lakh. At age 75, it is Rs 47.310 lakh. In the case of a Havaldar, his equivalent in the civil, at age 60, would get Rs 20.261 lakh more and this figure is Rs 26.639 lakh at age 70 and at 75 it is Rs 29.828 lakh. In the case of a Subedar, these figures at ages 60, 70 and 75 years are Rs 13.979 lakh, Rs 18.911 lakh and Rs 21.277 lakh respectively, more for the civil servant.

A soldier retiring at 35 years of age will live through at least four Central Pay Commissions and suffer their dispensations for retirees. Whereas his counterpart in the civil will not only continue to benefit from successive CPCs while still in service for an additional 25 years, but on retirement will be effected by just one CPC, assuming 70 years as the average age expectancy. Therefore, even if OROP is granted, defence personnel will continue to suffer these gross disadvantages.
Similar figures are available for officers. The disparities are due to early retirement, delayed and extremely limited promotions in higher ranks. All these features are service imperatives. Within the defence services, earlier retirees are further disadvantaged. A soldier who retired prior to January 1, 2006 will get far less pension than a soldier who retired after this date. For a Havaldar who retired prior to this date, his pension is less than a Sepoy who retired after this date.

The ad-hoc compensation promised to the other ranks is completely inadequate and fails to address the core issue of OROP. Similar situation prevails in the case of officers. Only one with severely impaired vision, limited intelligence and/or deep seated bias can miss the incongruity in this working.

The above disparities are independent of X factor which apply to only defence personnel. About 15 per cent of soldiers get the opportunity to live with their families for a period of one to two years in their entire service. In the case of others (including officers), only 40 to 50 per cent of their service, they live with their families. Then there are other travails of service such as harsh living conditions in uncongenial and high altitude areas which results in approximately 5000 of them being annually boarded out on medical grounds. Thousands live with ailments and continue to serve.

Then there is the curtailment on fundamental rights and harsh military law to contend with. Entry into the officer cadre has become the last career choice for the country’s youth. Consequently, huge shortages persist.

Few seem to realise the strong bonding that exists between the veterans and the serving. There is continued interaction between units and their retired personnel and that is how units sustain the regimental spirit and traditions.

During leave, the serving come in contact with the retired and the dissatisfaction of the later gets passed to the serving. Therefore, there is the danger of spill-over effect of this disenchantment and disgruntlement of the veterans passing on to the serving. It will indeed be a sad day for the country when this distress is fully transferred to the serving.

The demand for OROP is fair and just and is only a part-compensation for early retirement, extremely limited promotions and a miniscule recompense for a hard and risk filled career. The political executive ought to realise the injustice being done to the soldier and accept in good grace, what is fair and what is just.

[Dudee]

Beyond narrow boundaries
We must change our mindset to meet new security challenges, says Gen V.P. Malik (retd)

Illustration: Kuldeep DhimanONE of the cornerstones of a democracy is a healthy civil military relationship. India stands out as the greatest success story in civil military relations amongst developing nations of the world. The nation and its military are rightfully proud of it.

However, should the discourse on civil military relations remain confined to the facts that in our country there have never been open criticism of the government’s policies on military affairs, never any combat refusal, or anything like a threat of military takeover? Unfortunately, most of our experts and the media are content to focus on the presence or absence of civilian control, politicisation, military discontent and discipline as the only considerations worthy of attention. Little attention is paid to the dynamics of politico-military strategies and civil military discourse on military capabilities and doctrines for any future conflicts.

In his seminal book, The Soldier and the State, Samuel Huntington states that “the objective of military security policy of a nation is to develop a system of civil military relations which will maximise military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.” Is India getting maximum value from its civil military relations and discourse?

Indeed, India’s defense and security report card for the past six decades plus has been more positive than negative. Despite a weak strategic culture, reactive strategic policies, ad hoc defense planning, intelligence failures and strategic surprises, the armed forces have maintained India’s security and territorial integrity better than any other democratic, developing nation in the world.

However, the credit for these successes goes less to any strategic foresight or higher direction of war and more to personnel involved in operational planning and fighting on the ground. In most conflicts, India has failed to convert hard-won operational achievements into long-term strategic successes.

The 21st century has ushered in a new era in security and the nature of conflict and warfare. While conventional war as an instrument of foreign policy has become increasingly unviable due to high costs, casualties and international pressures, limited, asymmetric and sub-conventional conflicts have become more likely. And when they occur, it is not possible to take them to the logical conclusion of military victories as was the case in the past. They have to be conducted with the objective of achieving political successes rather than military victories.

The USA and its allies could not achieve victory in Iraq, Kosovo or Afghanistan. In Kargil war, too, the political aim and terms of reference prevented the Indian military from crossing the Line of Control and escalating the conflict.

With such a paradigm shift in the nature of conflicts, the military has to be prepared for an elongated spectrum, ranging from aid to civil authority, counter-terrorism, different levels of conventional war, to a war involving weapons of mass destruction. In this environment, the separation between tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare stands blurred.

Greater mobility, long reach in targeting and more effective communications and control have obscured tactical and strategic boundaries. A small military action along the Line of Control or a terrorists’ act in the hinterland become issues for consideration and decision making at the highest political level.

In such a war or war-like situation, selection of political and military objectives and time available to execute missions becomes crucial for planning and conduct of operations. There has to be complete understanding between the political and military leadership on these issues.

Careful and calibrated orchestration of military operations, diplomacy and domestic political environment become essential for the successful outcome. Continuous control of the “escalatory ladder” requires close political oversight and politico- civil- military interaction. Some important challenges likely to be encountered in a future conflict would be:

lPolitical definition of the goals and its translation into military objectives. This is always difficult, sometimes uncertain and indirect. Yet its success is critical for the attainment of the political goals.

lAbility to react rapidly to a developing or a surprise crisis. The military would be expected to react quickly: enhance deterrence, arrest deterioration of the situation, diminish adversary’s incentives for escalation, and/or to carry out a riposte.

lMobilising and sustaining domestic and internationally political support for such military operations would depend upon the ability of the military to operate in a manner that conforms to political legitimacy, i.e. avoid civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage.

lMilitarily, the greatest challenge would be the political reluctance to commit a pro-active engagement and its insistence to retain the authority for approving not just key military moves but also many operational decisions.

lPolitical requirements and military targeting would need a heavy reliance on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance for target selection. Airpower, precision guided weapons, standoff armaments, and artillery would be first weapons of choice.

lEmployment of ground forces across the borders may be discouraged or delayed.

lOwing to growing transparency of the battlefield, information strategy and its implementation would be important. Political requirements of the military operations to achieve and retain the moral high ground and deny that to the adversary would need a comprehensive and sophisticated media, public affairs and information campaign.

This then leads this writer to ask, is India getting the required advice from our military? Do we have the right national security system and processes for this purpose?

Every nation requires strategically sound — not just militarily effective — advice to political authorities who are representative of and answerable to Parliament and a vibrant civil society.

The general impression in India and abroad is that our military leaders are not in a position to provide such advice to the political leadership. Such an impression appears valid when we ask ourselves:

lDoes our military demonstrate critical and creative understanding of the strategic purposes, contributions and consequences of military operational employment and institutional conduct? Does it demonstrate a willingness to speak up, and when necessary speak out, especially in opposition to strategically flawed policies and initiatives? The military brass has a duty not only to the political masters but also to the Constitution and the men that they command.

lDo our civilian authorities demonstrate critical understanding of larger strategic issues, constraints, effects and implications of military operational employment and its institutional conduct? Are they fully conversant with military purposes, capabilities, constraints and effects?

lAre the civilian authorities who oversee the military adequately competent strategically? Do we have the correct political supremacy and oversight of the military or is it very substantially through a bureaucratic proxy? Encouraging a timid military may be good for the civilian ego. But equally, that makes for poor strategic sense.

War, Clausewitz noted, is continuation of politics by other means. Recent wars have involved much greater level of integration of politics, diplomacy and military planning and execution than in the past. Even when a decision to employ the military is made, the political leadership seldom allows autonomous conduct of the war to the military. In practice, there is continuing erosion of the dividing lines between war and politics.

India’s national security framework and its antiquated civil–military relationship have not grown in step with the needs of new security challenges. It is essential that we change our mindsets and attitudes and look beyond narrow boundaries defined by turf and parochialism. For that, we need urgent changes in our security structure and procedures to make it more efficient, resilient, and speedily responsive.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff

[Dudee]

Top


Army can’t do without ‘sahayaks’
by Col Pritam Bhullar (retd)

THE Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence asked the Army the other day to abolish the “colonial” practice of employing jawans as “sahayaks” of officers as it felt that this system was “demeaning and humiliating”.

In reply to the committee’s suggestion, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has said that a sahayak is “a comrade- in-arms” to an officer. The Army has reacted to this suggestion by issuing instructions to its units to ensure that combatant soldiers are not employed on jobs that are not in conformity with the dignity and self-respect of a soldier.

Employing “sahayaks” is not a “colonial” practice as all armies in the world have combatant soldiers as batmen integral to the organisations of their units. Sahayak is a Hindi version of batman.

The MOD has rightly said that a sahayak (batman) is a comrade-in-arms to an officer. His duties are to ensure that an officer’s dresses are kept ready and laid out for all appropriate occasions, for instance, P.T. dress, uniform, mess dress, etc.

In war, he carries the radio set of the officer/JCO he is employed with apart from being with him in the thick and thin of war.

In other worlds, he is a buddy of the officer/JCO he is working with. This relationship is life-long and does not end with the retirement of the officer and his sahayak.

During his visit to India in February 1968, Lieut-Gen Sir Reginald Savory recorded about his relationship with his old batman thus: “I joined the 14th Sikh 54 years ago in 1914 when I was just 20 years old. Only this morning (February Lance Naik Bhola Singh of the 14th Sikh, who had been wounded in Gallipoli in 1915, took the trouble to come all the way from his home to call upon me; and after 52 years we saw each other again. Now he is ‘chitti dahri walla’ and I am old and bald; but although we both have grown so much older, yet our affection for each other and our mutual pride in our Regiment stays as young as ever. Long may this continue.”

While asking the Army to shed the batman system, the Parliamentary Committee seems to have totally forgotten that the Army is meant to fight a war; therefore, all its establishments are designed to cater to war-like situations.

Most of the time the units are in field areas where they cannot employ civilian manpower for security reasons.

There is no doubt that some officers employ sahayaks on jobs which are below the dignity of a soldier. Rather than discarding the sahayak system for this reason, such officers should be taken to task to stop this unethical practice.

There is no system or rule that is not being misused or abused in this country today. If we start discarding/abolishing systems or rules for this reason, then no system will remain intact.

Incidentally, the sahayak system is not only prevalent in the Army but is also in vogue in the paramilitary and police forces. In most police forces its misuse is well-known to the public. A lot of manpower of the police is used even by retired officers in the name of security.

In the days of yore, one could not even think of using a batman on a duty, which was below the dignity of a soldier, leave alone doing so. But then what one should not forget is that in those days, the officers, by and large, came from a different background.

Why talk of this, see the number of corruption cases among the senior officers today. We never heard of a senior officer being involved in a disciplinary case in the olden days. But today when all other organisations in the country have deteriorated in standards, how could the Army having the same countrymen remain unaffected?

There should be no question of abolishing the sahayak system as it is integral to the Army and its necessity remains beyond any doubt. The senior officers, however, must ensure that neither do they misuse sahayaks nor they allow their subordinates to do so.

What all officers need to remember is that besides professional competence, the only other secret to command men with dignity and respect is to hold them in high esteem.

[Dudee]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100401/nation.htm

Gen VK Singh takes over
A first: Trained commando becomes Army chief

New Delhi, March 31
More than 40 years ago, three young men were together in a squadron, ‘the hunters’ as cadets at the National Defence Academy, Pune. Today, when General VK Singh took over as Chief of the Indian Army, he may have been a unique co-incidence. Now all the three serving service Chiefs are from the same squadron of the NDA where they together spent their formative years.

Old timers do not recall a similar instance when all three Chiefs are from the same squadron of the NDA. There are 15 squadrons at the NDA and each squadron has 100-120 cadets of various batches at any given point of point of time. Each of the squadron is attached to a Battalion which are four in number. The ‘hunters’ are under the 2nd Battalion. Most of the interaction between cadets is limited to the squadrons they belong to or to their own course mates. The entire training period is spent together in competition with other squadrons in sports, academics and extra-curricular activities.

The other two from the “hunters” Air Chief Marshall PV Naik and Admiral Nirmal Verma are already the chiefs of the IAF and the Navy, respectively. Gen Singh joined this two former mates today as he took over as Army Chief at his office located in the South Block.

General V K Singh, who is from the Rajput Regiment, took over as the Chief of the Indian Army, the second largest in the world. General Deepak Kapoor handed charge over to him. The outgoing Chief and his successor were accompanied by their wives at brief ceremony this morning. General Singh will be 26th chief of the Army and will stay at the helm of the 1.13 million-strong force for over two years.

General VK Singh is the first trained commando to take over as the Army Chief. He was awarded the ‘Commando Dagger’ for standing first in the course. He has seen action in the 1971 war as a young lieutenant. He has experience in counter-insurgency operations along the Line of Control. He has also commanded the Jalandhar-based 11 Corps and the Ambala-based 2 Strike Corps.

General Kapoor retired from the Army after over four decades of service and would formally cease to be the Army Chief at midnight tonight.




Court defers order on CBI plea to withdraw Bofors case

New Delhi, March 31
A Delhi Court today deferred till April 17 pronouncement of its order on a plea of a lawyer objecting to CBI's move to withdraw the two-decade-old Bofors pay-off case against Italian businessman Ottavio Quattrocchi.

Metropolitan Magistrate Sandeep Garg adjourned the matter after Additional Solicitor General PP Malhotra submitted that the original records, which were sent to the Supreme Court, have yet not been returned.

Advocate Ajay Agrawal, who had filed an application against CBI’s move to withdraw the case on October 3, argued that the appeal filed by him in October 2005 in the matter was still pending before the Apex court. He claimed that CBI had not filed the appeal against the Delhi High Court judgment discharging some accused in the case. Meanwhile, the Apex court yesterday asked Agrawal to withdraw his petition seeking directions to CBI to take action for stopping the de-freezing of bank accounts of Quattrocchi in London. It, however, allowed him to file a fresh petition against 70-year-old Quattrocchi.

A Delhi court had on November 6 last year deferred the pronouncement of its order, saying that it did not have the original documents as those have been sent to the Supreme Court.

Quattrocchi, the sole surviving accused in the case after the Delhi High Court quashed the charges on May 31, 2005 against other accused, has never appeared before any court in the country. — PTI

[Dudee]

Don’t treat Army men shabbily, SC tells govt


New Delhi, April 1
The Supreme Court has directed the government to treat Army personnel in a “better and more humane manner” in respect of emoluments, pension and other benefits as they were bravely defending the country at the cost of their lives.

A Bench comprising Justices Markandey Katju and AK Patnaik passed the order yesterday while dismissing a government appeal against a Punjab and Haryana High Court verdict, granting disability pension to an officer for the entire 10-year period of commissioned service.

CS Sidhu was given short service commission on June 22, 1968, for five years, which was extendable by another five years. He was posted in a high-altitude field area and while being on duty on November 21, 1970, he met with an accident and suffered severe injuries. As a result of the accident, his right arm had to be amputated and he also suffered a compound fracture in the thighbone and another fracture in the jawbone. He was released from service on June 23, 1978.

For calculating the amount of disability pension, the Army authorities had taken into account only the period between the date of joining and the date of the accident.

Describing as “a pittance” the “meagre pension” of Rs 1,000 a month plus DA granted by the Army to the affected officer, the Bench said, “If this is the manner in which the Army personnel are treated, it can only be said that it is extremely unfortunate.”

[Dudee]

Army chief orders ‘operation clean-up’
More than 20 senior officers guilty in various scams in the past four years
Ajay Banerjee/Tribune News Service

New Delhi, April 1
Virtually shaking up the Indian Army out of its self-imposed ‘silence’ on the issue of corruption within the services, the new Army chief, Gen VK Singh, today announced a ‘clean-up’ operation. “…We want to set our own culture right… improve the internal health of the organisation… the Army value system has to be different from the civil society”.

More than 20 senior officers (Brigadier or above) face charges of corruption or moral turpitude in the past three years or so. Some have been cashiered, others have been jailed, one is facing a CBI probe while a few escaped with a censure. General VK Singh, who started his tenure today, made it clear for what he stands for and how he will go about correcting the image of the world’s second largest Army.

In the past few years, senior officers have been held guilty by the Army Court of Inquiries for a liquor scam, a dry ration scam, a frozen meat scam, for accepting gratification for purchases and even for molesting a woman officer. These are apart from the much publicised and the latest Darjeeling land scam where four senior officers have been held blameworthy of having colluded with a private builder to issue a no-objection certificate.

It was General VK Singh, in his earlier capacity as GOC-in-C of the Eastern Command, who had ordered the inquiry into the Darjeeling land scam, which recommended the summary dismissal of the Military Secretary (MS) Lt Gen Avadesh Prakash. He, as MS, decided all transfers, postings and promotions of senior officers. A summary dismissal is one of the harshest punishments-the rank is stripped, the pension is stopped and the person does not qualify to be an ex-serviceman. Others facing various levels of action in the same case are Lt Gen Ramesh Halgali, Lt Gen PK Rath and Maj Gen P. Sen.

Another of the recent cases is of Maj Gen AK Lal, who was dismissed after having been found guilty of molesting a junior woman officer. The woman’s parents, based in Dehradun, had lodged a written complaint against the Major General to the then Army chief Gen JJ Singh.

In early 2007, the two Lieutenant Generals of the Army Service Corps (ASC), S.K. Dahiya and S.K. Sahni, were indicted in two separate cases involving irregularities in the procurement of frozen meat for troops posted in Ladakh and discrepancies in procurement of dry rations, respectively. In the latter case, the CoI recommended disciplinary action against Brig SK Handa and Brig PS Gill. The officers have appealed and matter is now pending before a civil court.

Last year two Major Generals of the Army Ordnance Corps, Anand Swaroop and SP Sinha, faced separate charges of irregularities in the purchase of stores. The two were in running for the top post of DG Ordnance Services (DGOS) at Army HQ. In 2007, the CBI booked Maj Gen Anand Kapoor for possessing disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs 5 crore.

Another notable case was of Gur Iqbal Singh Multani, a Major General, who was found guilty of attempting to smuggle large quantities of defence liquor to his hometown. He was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment, stripped of his rank and dismissed from service by a military court.




New chief wants agile, responsive Army


New Delhi, April 1
The new Chief of the Army, Gen VK Singh, today made it clear that his top priorities will include modernisation of the forces and filling the gaps in operational readiness to make the Army "more lethal, agile and responsive”.

With huge experience in counter-insurgency and high altitude operations, Gen Singh said, “.. the Army would be unable to meet external threats effectively till its internal health is not good”.

Talking to a group of journalists in his office at the South Block here this evening he said, “Our core values, our ethos and tradition will receive due attention”.

“An internal audit will matter a lot to me,” the General said. On being asked to elaborate as to what he meant by the “internal health”, the General identified core values, selflessness, credentials, norms and professionalism of the Army and the strengthening of these. He, however, refused to term it as “a crackdown on corruption”. Such terms “will never take us any far”. “On capacity building and modernisation of Chinese military he said the Army would “stand up and measure up to the challenge”.

[Dudee]

Army Chief’s hard talk
Tackling corruption is high priority

It is not usual for a Chief of Army Staff to publicly make adverse observations about the ‘internal health’ of the Indian Army that is otherwise held in high public esteem. General V.K. Singh may have charted a new course in publicly acknowledging the gravity of the problem on the day of his assuming charge as Army Chief and announcing a need for an ‘operation clean up’. But he is not the first to acknowledge that there is a serious problem within the Army. In February 1985, a quarter century ago, General K. Sundarji had on assuming command as Army chief issued an internal letter criticising the Army’s officer cadre for ‘becoming increasingly careerist, opportunistic and sycophantic’ while lamenting the decline in ‘standards of integrity’. His letter was preceded by a decade-long debate within the Army through much of the 1970s that corruption was fast becoming a bane of the Indian Army. But never before in the Army’s post-Independence history has moral, professional and material corruption been making headlines as frequently as in this decade with many among them Lt Generals and Major Generals.

The Army, which has an impressive record of post-partition nation consolidation and subsequent nation preservation that has involved fighting wars with belligerent neighbours and quelling insurgency and terrorism in far flung states caused mostly by political and administrative mismanagement, has played a critical role in the country’s post-Independence history. For a complex mix of reasons ranging from careerism, a steadily growing inability to attract the best and brightest, shortage of officers, hardship postings ranging from harsh terrains to insurgencies that entail long separations from family, a steady decline in the warrant of precedence, questionable remuneration, and a widespread culture of corruption nationwide has combined to create a rot.

General Singh is right in saying that the Army’s value system has to be different from civil society. Difficult as it is, ridding the Army of corruption has become absolutely imperative for an institution that must always be above board and which is crucial to national security.

[Dudee]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/201004 ... /main4.htm
Battle for supremacy

At 20,000 feet plus, Siachen Glacier — where the rarest commodity is oxygen — is the
highest battleground in the world. The Indian soldier is ready to sacrifice his life for the
protection of this patch of earth, writes Major-Gen G. G. Dwivedi (retd)

THE area is absolutely white, with visibility almost zero. In the literal sense, the right hand does not know what the left is up to. Thick snowflakes, like bird feathers, have been falling non-stop for the last couple of days. The thin, skinny ridge, Saltoro, with a thick coating of fresh snow, looks, indeed, gorgeous. At 20,000 feet plus, Siachen Glacier is closest to heaven.

Each soldier in the land of Siachen Glacier is an unsung hero
Each soldier in the land of Siachen Glacier is
an unsung hero Photo: Manoj Mahajan

The temperature hovers around minus 40 degree Celsius (pronounced as the coldest place outside the polar region). Human body efficiency drops down drastically, and the rarest commodity is oxygen. Visiting dignitaries, especially senior defence officers from foreign countries, are awestruck as they humbly share the fact that the highest mountain peaks in their countries are dwarfed by the height of this battleground. How soldiers can deliver under such conditions, without incentives like a periodic "rest and recreation" holiday, intrigues them.

Amidst the above setting, soldiers of India and Pakistan are continuously at a tug of war, to hang on to the Ridge Line, under all odds. At one particular stretch, the opponents are separated by barely half the length of a soccer field. My team at this spot has an advantage of around 150 height differential. This gives us a formidable edge. The piece of earth here, laden with heavy layers of snow, is most valuable to both sides. They will not part with even an inch in lieu of the world’s gold, and can make extreme sacrifice, without qualms, to defend or gain just a few feet.

The severity of the inclement weather personifies this land and offers ideal setting for the "cat and mouse" game. Both sides make the best of such a situation to stock up, as also undertake surreptitious attempts for gaining the upper hand. This results in a sporadic, violent exchange of fire. Adversaries are locked in a near bear hug due to the close geographic proximity. Understandably, only small arms can be effectively employed. The lethal effect of the short engagements is known only when there is a bit of commotion, or radio intercepts, signifying some catastrophic situation. The game has its own set of unwritten rules. If either side has a casualty, evacuation is permitted. The two observe a brief truce, which may last just a few minutes, when the fingers are off the triggers of their weapons.

Intermittently, the weather does clear out. On such a bright day, activities are dead still, as any movement, or the slightest sound is sure draw to a volley of fire. Everyone waits for darkness to set in so that routine activity can be resumed. Consequently, the body bio clock has been fine-tuned; breakfast in the evening, lunch at midnight and dinner at the crack of down.

During my frequent visits to this post, I share an ice shelter with a dozen other men. As Commanding Officer, the only luxury I enjoy is my three feet of space on the long skid board, a makeshift sleeping platform. However, I have to accept my share of bumping, jostling and, of course, community snoring.

Interestingly, besides humans, there are three other co-habitants for company, who have also dug in their feet here. These are dogs, crows and rats. The former are the most faithful and remain confined to the post, but are always alert. Canines dutifully accompany the link patrols and are a great asset in direction keeping and warning against crevices. Crows and rats enjoy absolute freedom of action. These creatures have an amazing sixth sense. They can anticipate fire duels and head for safe spots promptly. Both cross over, at will, the imaginary Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), separating the two belligerent nations to savour the cuisine of the either side. Their loyalties are dubious. The crow is the size of an owl, and the rat is as big as a rabbit. It is evident that both sides are logistically well sustained. Who says you can’t have bread buttered on both sides?

Over a two-month cycle, when an individual goes for a short break, he is lighter by a few kgs due to the effect of the acute high altitude. With flowing beards (as shaving is impossible) and unwashed bodies, everybody looks lean, mean and ferocious. Each man here is an unsung hero. He is ready to come back to complete another 60 days’ cycle, purely for the love of his buddies and nostalgia for the land of Siachen Glacier.

One often wonders why does a soldier always stands apart. Well, it is because of the unparalleled solemn commitment. He will never ever let go of this patch of earth, the so-called "No Man’s Land," and for its protection, he is ready to sacrifice his life.

[Dudee]

The Army’s new role in Kashmir
Factor in threat dynamics, preserve gains
by Maj-Gen Ashok K. Mehta (retd)

Last week, Defence Minister A.K. Antony warned the Army to expect a hot summer in Jammu and Kashmir not due to climate change but Pakistan’s resolve to escalate violence. Recent calls for jihad in Kashmir by the United Jihad Council and the threat of water wars against India by Lashkar chief Hafiz Saeed are part of the new game plan.

Of the 42 terrorist training camps, 32 are known to be operational with 2,500 militants, some equipped with GPS and sophisticated Thuraya sets ready to breach the fencing on the LoC to reinforce the dwindling strength of militants declined from a high of 3000 to 3500 in 2001-02 to just 600 today.

The calls for withdrawal of the Army are, therefore, insane and claims on deinduction of 35,000 troops not entirely correct. The two Divisions withdrawn are part of theatre reserves and were deployed during Operation Parakram. These were later relocated along the fencing and have been redeployed in their original locations on restoration of normalcy.

With militancy brought down in 2008-09 to the lowest levels in two decades, Jammu and Kashmir is ripe for a political solution which could lead to demilitarisation of forces.

The Army was rushed into Srinagar in October 1947 to save it from the onslaught of Pakistani raiders. It has not ceased battling infiltrators since that day but over time has created conditions for the political process which has lagged behind to take over. The strategy followed by New Delhi has been to keep insurgencies under control, the military employing minimal force in good faith. The government has shown neither any urgency for conflict resolution nor concern for civilian and combatant casualties which have exceeded the collective fatalities of all the wars. India has missed at least two opportunities in 1971 and 2007 to resolve the Kashmir dispute on its terms or ones favourable to it.

The Army is deployed in Jammu and Kashmir both in its war locations on LoC as well as in the counterinsurgency grid, the latter in aid to civil authority. This is unique: the Army performing its primary and secondary roles in one geographical entity. The intention has been to free the Army from its counter-militancy role, with Central and state police forces gradually taking charge. That began to happen in the late 1980s just before crossborder infiltration and militancy rocketed in August 1989.

Srinagar garrison duties were taken over from the Army’s fighting formation by the Sub Area headquarters which handed over to the BSF. While Srinagar is under the CRPF charge today, the idea is for state police forces to eventually take over CIS duties. The CRPF in Anantnag and the BSF in Sopore are just the preliminary steps towards demilitarisation.

In 2007, a committee under Defence Secretary Shekhar Dutt had evolved a relocation plan for troops to vacate orchards, hotels, schools and other civilian premises affecting business and livelihood. Not only has the Army relocated but also paid a modest compensation.

Political initiatives were launched by the NDA government to defuse tension on the LoC and minimise violence in the state. NSA Brajesh Mishra and his Pakistani equivalent, Tariq Aziz working back channel produced the first ceasefire in November 2003. It has held with some violations but over all, provided immense relief to both sides and in financial terms, amounting to Rs 500 crore annually. The big lacuna of the case fire was that cross-border infiltration was excluded as the ceasefire was between the two armies.

The other ceasefire that materialised all too briefly during 2000-01 was internal between the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and the government. At least twice, UJC chief Salauddin offered conditional ceasefires but these never took off. Operationally, the internal ceasefire had limited utility as foreign militants who constitute 60 per cent of the armed militants were not part of it. Some conversations did take place between intelligence agencies and the Hizb.

The scaling down by the Army of the militant population from a high of 3000 fighters to the current 600 has taken over a decade of hard work. The balance of advantage shifted in the Army’s favour only after it ensured that the attrition of militants outstripped their rate of reinforcement. Fencing along the LoC and a more proactive CIS strategy backed by high-tech equipment blunted militancy that in 2004 it was near-zero infiltration.

The Army’s elaborate Sadbhavna programmes and sensitivity to human rights helped to wean away the people from the militants, especially in the rural areas. The challenge for the Army and security forces is not just to “keep the cap on 600” but to reduce this figure further.

The call for troop withdrawal for reasons of political expediency does not factor in the threat dynamics and the imperative to preserve the hard-earned gains. What is politically correct is operationally fatal. The other demand for repealing the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is intimately linked to providing legal safeguards for troops fighting militancy.

AFSPA was notified in 1989 by declaring three districts of Jammu and Kashmir as disturbed areas — the Kashmir Valley and Doda. The ministries of Home and Defence are engaged in making AFSPA more people-friendly and humane but as long as cross-border activities continue, its repeal will undermine the operational effectiveness of troops.

Reducing the stress and strain on security forces is the moral responsibility of the military and political leadership. It is the failure of governance that leads to the political mess which the administration expects the Army to clean up. There is no Sri Lanka-type solution in Jammu and Kashmir and what had been achieved represents the best feasible for transition to the political process.

In 1971, the government frittered away the political and diplomatic gains of the historic military victory in East Pakistan. For more than two decades after that missed opportunity, the government took no substantive action towards a political solution. In 2006-07, back channel talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s envoy on Pakistan, Satinder Lambah and the Musharraf-confidant Tariq Aziz produced the four-point Kashmir formula. India could not have expected a better agreement.

Unfortunately, the front channel was unable to capitalise on it. Srinagar lies in the flight path of the Taliban suicide bomber who arrived in Muzaffarabad across the LoC earlier this year. The last and only human bomber to strike in India was LTTE’s Dhanu who took out Rajiv Gandhi.

Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed only fidayeen attacks which is kid stuff compared with multiple suicide bombings, now routine in Pakistan. The Army should be prepared to deter this challenge as the growing turbulence in Af-Pak is bound to rock Kashmir soon. Sixty-two years after it launched its first post-independence, expeditionary forces in Jammu and Kashmir the Army must be ready and willing to stick it out for at least a half century and more, with a fair likelihood of it getting sucked into the Maoist cauldron too.

That’s the price the country has to pay for political shortsightedness and preference for conflict management rather than its resolution.

[Dudee]

Leadership key issue
A national security strategy is required

The new Army Chief, General Vijay Kumar Singh, takes office at a time when the armed forces are desperately looking for a good leadership. The onus now is on him (and on the other two service chiefs) to give the Indian defence policy a new direction, a trajectory that does justice to India’s rising stature in the global inter-state hierarchy. Blaming the government for all the ills afflicting the defence seems to be becoming the default position within the ranks of the military, and taking this too far can be really dangerous for the liberal democratic ethos of this nation.
Gen Vijay Kumar Singh takes up the challenge
Gen Vijay Kumar Singh takes up the challenge

India’s armed forces need a fundamental restructuring that enables them to operate with utmost efficiency in the rapidly evolving domestic and global context. The armed forces can begin by putting their own house in order.

It is true that big issues remain beyond the influence of the armed forces as they have to work within the strategic framework set by the civilian leadership. The Indian economy will have to continue to grow at high rates of growth if the Indian defence needs are to be adequately catered to. High rates of economic growth over the last several years have given India the resources to undertake its military modernisation programme and redefine its defence priorities.

A country like India does not have the luxury to make a choice between guns and butter and high economic growth is the only solution that will allow it to take care of its defence and developmental needs simultaneously. India’s own version of “revolution in military affairs” will force it to spend much more on sophisticated cutting-edge defence technology and on trained manpower.

The other issue is of appropriate institutional frameworks that enable a nation to effectively leverage its capabilities — diplomatic, military and economic — in the service of its strategic interests. India lacks such institutions in the realm of foreign and defence policies. While the Prime Minister laments the paucity of long-term strategic thinking in India, his government has done nothing substantive to stimulate such thinking.

The National Security Council still does not work as it ideally should. The headquarters of the three services need to be effectively integrated with the Ministry of Defence and the post of Chief of Defence Staff is the need of the hour for single-point military advice to the government.

The fact that the successive governments have failed to produce a national security strategy is both a consequence of the institutional decay in the country as well as a cause of the inability of the armed forces to plan their force structures and acquisitions adequately to meet their future challenges.

Yet, the politico-bureaucratic establishment is not the only guilty party here as the armed forces also have a lot to answer for. Their top leadership has shied away from making tough choices about reducing manpower strength, adjusting the inter-service budgetary balance and restructuring the professional military education system.

Resources alone, however, will not make the armed forces the envy of its adversaries. It is the policy direction that is set by the military leadership and the quality of training imparted to its manpower that will make the difference.

The questions that need to be debated and answered include: Do we have a 21st century military in terms of doctrine and force structure? Have the doctrines and force structures evolved in line with the equipment that the nation’s resources are being spent on? Do India’s command and control processes reflect the changing strategic and operational requirements? Does the military have the capacity to initiate actions on very short notice and actually conduct military operations that result in something other than a stalemate, something that India might have wanted to do during Operation Parakrama in 2001-02 but could not? Have the armed forces got the balance between capital and labour right?

The armed forces will have to find a way to strike a balance between growing manpower shortage and the easing of budgetary constraints. The services have no option but to modernise their human resources policy — recruitment, retention, promotions, exit et al which will make a huge difference to the satisfaction levels of the rank and file.

The armed forces need to do some serious introspection if these issues are to be sorted out before it’s too late. It is disappointing to see the service headquarters continuing to resist greater integration and inter-services rivalry continuing to be as vicious as in the past. When the Army came up with the doctrine of Cold Start, it found no support for it in the other services. The other services may have had genuine concerns about the doctrine but they have made no attempt to reconcile their differences, underlining Indian operational weaknesses.

The armed forces face a choice: They can keep blaming the political-bureaucratic establishment and do nothing or they can initiate a process of internal reforms forthwith. India’s future, in many ways, will depend on the choice that they make.